Revisiting a (Terribly) Wrongful Confession: Part II
In Part I of this investigation, we examined Jessie Misskelley’s confession under a due process clause analysis to reveal the coercive tactics that lead to a factually inaccurate confession by a vulnerable, borderline-retarded teen. That unreliable and highly prejudicial confession was leaked to the press without any mention of its weaknesses. Based on that confession, Jessie Misskelley, Damien Echols and Jason Baldwin appeared guilty to the general public before their trials even began.
Today we will examine his confession through the prism of the fifth amendment.
Just as the due process clause protects against involuntary confessions, the fifth amendment protects people from the use of “compelled” confessions in trials. Our judicial system is very protective of people’s fifth amendment rights against compelled confessions. The Supreme Court has even acknowledged that any “police interview of an individual suspected of a crime has coercive aspects to it.”
To mitigate these coercive aspects, the Court in 1966 announced a rule in Miranda v. Arizona that required police to inform people of their Constitutional rights before beginning a formal interrogation. These rights, well known to all of us as the Miranda rights, require that people be warned of their right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used as evidence against them, and that they are entitled to an attorney and if they cannot afford one, the court will appoint one. Anyone who’s watched an episode of “Law & Order” knows that.
What’s not as well known: courts presume that people haven’t waived these rights unless the government proves that they did so “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently,”
Although Mr. Misskelley was read his Miranda rights, his age and cognitive disabilities should have been carefully considered when determining whether he validly waived them. And without a valid waiver, Mr. Misskelley’s confession should have been excluded from his trial. Read more »







